This is version 3.0
Copyright © 2000 Eric S. Raymond
Copyright
Permission is granted to copy, distribute and/or modify this document under the terms of the Open Publication License, version 2.0.
$Date: 2002/08/02 09:02:15 $
Revision History | ||
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Revision 1.22 | 24 August 2000 | esr |
Handicap theory, peacocks, and stags. Parallels with knighthood. | ||
Revision 1.22 | 24 August 2000 | esr |
DocBook 4.1 conversion. | ||
Revision 1.21 | 31 Aug 1999 | esr |
Major revision for the O'Reilly book. Incorporated some ideas about the costs of forking and rogue patches from Michael Chastain. Thomas Gagne (tgagne@ix.netcom.com) noticed the similarity between "seniority wins" and database heuristics. Henry Spencer's political analogy. Ryan Waldron and El Howard (elhoward@hotmail.com) contributed thoughts on the value of novelty. Thomas Bryan (tbryan@arlut.utexas.edu) explained the hacker revulsion to ``embrace and extend''. Darcy Horrocks inspired the new section ``How Fine A Gift?'' Other new material on the connection to the Maslovian hierarcy of values, and the taboo against attacks on competence. | ||
Revision 1.14 | 21 November 1998 | esr |
Minor editorial and stale-link fixes. | ||
Revision 1.10 | 11 July 1998 | esr |
Remove Fare Rideau's reference to `fame' at his suggestion. | ||
Revision 1.9 | 26 May 1998 | esr |
Incorporated Faré Rideau's noosphere/ergosphere distinction. Incorporated RMS's assertion that he is not anticommercial. New section on acculturation and academia (thanks to Ross J. Reedstrom, Eran Tromer, Allan McInnes, Mike Whitaker, and others). More about humility, (`egoless behavior') from Jerry Fass and Marsh Ray. | ||
Revision 1.8 | 27 April 1998 | esr |
Added Goldhaber to the bibliography. This is the version that will go in the Linux Expo proceedings. | ||
Revision 1.7 | 16 April 1998 | esr |
New section on `Global implications' discusses historical tends in the colonization of the noosphere, and examines the `category-killer' phenomenon. Added another research question. | ||
Revision 1.3 | 12 April 1998 | esr |
Typo fixes and responses to first round of public comments. First four items in bibliography. An anonymously contributed observation about reputation incentives operating even when the craftsman is unaware of them. Added instructive contrasts with warez d00dz, material on the `software should speak for itself' premise, and observations on avoiding personality cults. As a result of all these changes, the section on `The Problem of Ego' grew and fissioned. | ||
Revision 1.2 | 10 April 1998 | esr |
First published on the Web. |
Abstract
After observing a contradiction between the official ideology defined by open-source licenses and the actual behavior of hackers, I examine the actual customs that regulate the ownership and control of open-source software. I show that they imply an underlying theory of property rights homologous to the Lockean theory of land tenure. I then relate that to an analysis of the hacker culture as a `gift culture' in which participants compete for prestige by giving time, energy, and creativity away. Finally, I examine the consequences of this analysis for conflict resolution in the culture, and develop some prescriptive implications.
Table of Contents
Anyone who watches the busy, tremendously productive world of Internet open-source software for a while is bound to notice an interesting contradiction between what open-source hackers say they believe and the way they actually behave—between the official ideology of the open-source culture and its actual practice.
Cultures are adaptive machines. The open-source culture is a response to an identifiable set of drives and pressures. As usual, the culture's adaptation to its circumstances manifests both as conscious ideology and as implicit, unconscious or semi-conscious knowledge. And, as is not uncommon, the unconscious adaptations are partly at odds with the conscious ideology.
In this essay, I will dig around the roots of that contradiction, and use it to discover those drives and pressures. I will deduce some interesting things about the hacker culture and its customs. I will conclude by suggesting ways in which the culture's implicit knowledge can be leveraged better.